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COMPARISON ANALYSIS OF STREAM CIPHER
ALGORITHMS FOR DIGITAL COMMUNICATION
ABD RAHIM MAT SIDEK1 & AHMAD ZURI SHA’AMERI2
Abstract. The broadcast nature of radio communication such as in the HF (High Frequency)
spectrum exposes the transmitted information to unauthorized third parties. Confidentiality is ensured
by employing cipher system. For bulk transmission of data, stream ciphers are ideal choices over block
ciphers due to faster implementation speed and not introducing error propagation. The stream cipher
algorithms evaluated are based on the linear feedback shift register (LFSR) with nonlinear combining
function. By using a common key length and worst case conditions, the strength of several stream
cipher algorithms are evaluated using statistical tests, correlation attack, linear complexity profile and
nonstandard test. The best algorithm is the one that exceeds all of the tests.
Keywords: Confidential, LFSR, stream, block, correlation
Abstrak. Penghantaran maklumat dalam sistem komunikasi radio seperti frekuensi tinggi akan
mendedahkan maklumat itu kepada pihak-pihak yang tidak berkaitan. Untuk memastikan maklumat
tersebut selamat, ia haruslah dienkodkan terlebih dahulu sebelum dihantar. Bagi maklumat bersaiz
besar, pengenkod jenis satu bit adalah lebih sesuai berbanding pengenkod jenis blok kerana ia lebih
cepat dan tidak mempengaruhi bit bersebelahan jika berlakunya kesilapan semasa penghantaran.
Pengenkod satu bit biasanya dihasilkan menggunakan kaedah anjakan balik secara linear dan juga
penggabungan secara tidak linear. Dengan menggunakan panjang kunci yang sama untuk setiap
pengenkod iaitu 64 bit, kekuatan pengenkod ditentukan dengan menggunakan beberapa jenis ujian
piawaian. Pengenkod yang melepasi kesemua ujian adalah yang paling baik dan sesuai untuk digunakan
dalam penghantaran maklumat digital.
Kata kunci: Penghantaran, pengenkod, komunikasi, selamat, linear
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The introduction of advanced techniques in communication and digital signal
processing technology has improved the reliability of communication in the HF
spectrum. Besides, voice and telegraphy, text, fax and images can be transmitted using
HF modem [1, 2]. The broadcast nature of communication exposes the transmitted
information to unauthorized third party. Confidentially can be ensured by employing
cipher systems. Examples of the systems available in the market are Mils Electronic
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System 700 [3] and HC-6830 by Crypto AG [4]. Both systems are supported with stream
cipher to keep information safe. This is because stream ciphers are ideal choices over
block ciphers for bulk transmission of data such as text due to faster implementation
and not introducing error propagation.
This paper presents results for the analysis of various stream cipher algorithms such
as Linear Generator, Improved Geffe, Summation Register (2 and 3 Registers), Shrinking,
Multiplexing and Variable - Memory Binary Generator (Memory Generator). All of
these are based on the linear feedback shift registers with combining functions. For a
common key length of 64 bits, the objective is to find the best algorithm using the
statistical tests, linear complexity profile, correlation attack and guess and determine
attack. If necessary, the security of the algorithm can be enhanced by increasing the
key length to 128 bits or more.
2.0 CIPHER SYSTEMS
Cipher system is a system that encrypts and decrypts data. Generally, there are two
types of cipher systems: symmetric and asymmetric. The symmetric or the secret key
cipher system uses the same key in encryption and decryption while asymmetric or
the public key cipher system uses one key to encrypt and the other corresponding key
to decrypt. A cipher system comprises of 5 elements: the plaintext, cipher text, key,
encryption and decryption functions [5].
In general, the symmetric cipher systems are designed to ensure that cipher text can
only be decrypted by the corresponding secret key [6]. The core security factor for
symmetric cipher system is the encryption algorithm. It must be strong enough so that
it is impossible to decrypt a message based on the cipher-text alone. Secondly, the
security is dependent on the secrecy of the key, and not on the algorithm. Thus, it is not
required to keep algorithm secret.
There are two types of symmetric algorithms: stream ciphers and block ciphers.
Examples of symmetric cipher system are Data Encryption Standard (DES), Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES), IDEA, CAST, SEAL and RC4 [7]. Among these, RC4 and
SEAL are the stream ciphers and the rest are block ciphers.
The asymmetric or the public key cipher system makes use of various intractable
mathematic problems that are normally easy to calculate from one way but not its
inverse. These problems include discrete logarithm problem, the integer factorization
problem and elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Asymmetric cipher system
allows public keys to be simply distributed to the public. Data that is encrypted using
the published public key can only be decrypted using the secure private key kept
secretly by individuals. The computation of one key from the other key is infeasible.
Examples of asymmetric cipher systems are RSA, El-Gamal and elliptic curve [8].
JTjun46D[01].pmd 10/08/2007, 03:312
COMPARISON ANALYSIS OF STREAM CIPHER ALGORITHMS 3
3.0 STREAM CIPHER
The stream cipher [9] is a symmetric cipher that is described in Figure 1. Unlike the
block cipher, the stream cipher enciphers the plaintext one bit at a time and only
utilizes the confusion characteristics, not diffusion of the cipher system. This is because
each character of the cryptogram is independent of each other. The key component of
the stream cipher is the keystream generator as shown in Figure 2. Various types of
stream cipher can be generated based on the choice of the combining function and
the linear feedback shift registers (LFSR).
Each of the linear feedback shift registers (LFSR) that forms the keystream generators
is shown in Figure 3. The combining function can be any logic functions either linear
or nonlinear combination depending on algorithm.
Figure 1 Block diagram of stream cipher
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Figure 2 Block diagram of keystream generator
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Figure 3 A general case N-length linear feedback shift register (LFSR)
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3.1 Worst Case Condition
A cipher system is secured as long as the attacker does not know the algorithm, the
keys and equivalent plaintext and cryptogram. The algorithm is compromised if any
one of these factors is known. This leads to the worst case cryptographic conditions [9]
which are:
(i) The algorithm can completely be described.
(ii) A considerable amount of cryptogram is known.
(iii) There is certain amount of cryptogram and its equivalent plaintext
available.
For the first condition, the only security that can be provided by algorithm is in the
key length. Attack based on an exhaustive keysearch of all the possible keys should
not be possible within a reasonable time. Given the present computing technology, a
64 bit key is no longer considered safe compared to a 128 bit key. That is why a
double or triple DES (Data Encryption Standard) block cipher is considered more
secured compared to the basic DES algorithm. If a cryptogram is random, the second
condition is not valid since it is not possible to derive the plaintext from the cryptogram
based on the statistics. Condition (iii) is as the result of the known plaintext attack
where it is possible to derive the keystream from the cryptogram and its equivalent
plaintext. The strength of the keystream can be tested based on the correlation attack
and the linear complexity profile. An algorithm that can be proven of its strength
under the worst case cryptographic condition is considered ideal.
4.0 KEYSTREAM GENERATOR
There are many different pseudorandom sequence generators applied to stream
ciphering. This paper only discusses about stream cipher based on the structure of
LFSR as described in the previous section. The LFSR provides a simple way to obtain
sequences of vary high periods together with excellent statistics properties. The
following subsections explain the stream cipher based on LFSR and non-linear
combining function.
4.1 Linear Generator
A set of M LFSR’s is combined such that the output sequence is
z(n) = s0(n) ⊕ s1(n) ⊕ s2(n) ⊕ ... ⊕ sM–1(n) (1)
where s0(n), s1(n) ... SM–1(n) represent the outputs of LFSR 0 to M-1 [7]. If M is chosen
as 3, then Equation (1) becomes
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z(n) = s0(n) ⊕ s1(n) ⊕ s2(n) (2)
The LFSR used are defined by polynomials over GF(2) as shown in Equation (3), (4)
and (5):
= + + + +2 5 19( ) 1f x x x x x (3)
= + +5 23( ) 1f x x x  (4)
= + +2 29( ) 1f x x x (5)
4.2 Improved Geffe
This is a keystream generator based on a nonlinear combining function with three
LFSRs [11]. The output of the generator is
= ⊕ ⊕0 1 0 2 1 2( ) ( ). ( ) ( ). ( ) ( ). ( )z n s n s n s n s n s n s n  (6)
where s0(n), s1(n) and s2(n) are the output of the LFSR 0 to 2. The LFSR’s used are
defined by polynomials as in Equation (3) to (5) in GF(2).
4.3 Summation Register
Unlike the Improved Geffe generator, this keystream has an internal memory in the
combining function [11]. The summation register is
< >= ∑ 0 1( ), ( ) ( ( ), ( ), ( ))out inz n c n s n s n c n (7)
where s0(n) and s1(n) are the output of LFSR 0 and 1, cin(n) is the carry-in, cout(n) is the
carry-out and z(n) is the arithmetic sum of the input. Its equivalent Boolean equations
are
= ⊕ ⊕0 0 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )inz n s n s n c n (8)
= ⊕ ⊕0 1 0 1( ) ( ). ( ) ( ). ( ) ( ). ( )out in inc n s n s n s n c n s n c n (9)
Possible output for the generator can be chosen as:
= = −0( ) ( ) if ( ) ( 1)in outz n z n c n c n (10)
= = −0( ) ( ) if ( ) ( 1)out inz n c n c n z n (11)
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The configurations based on Equation (10) and (11) are known as summation register
(z0 output) and summation register (cout output) respectively. The polynomials used in
GF(2) are
= + +2 29( ) 1f x x x (12)
= + +3 41( ) 1f x x x (13)
Like linear generator, summation register is also expandable depending on numbers
of LFSR used. Previous description uses 2 LFSR, s0(n) and s1(n) respectively. For 3
LFSR nonlinear combinations, Boolean equations are
= ⊕ ⊕ ⊕0 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )o inz n s n s n s n c n (14)
= ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕
⊕
0 1 0 2 0 1 2
1 2
( ) ( ). ( ) ( ). ( ) ( ). ( ) ( ). ( )
( ). ( ) ( ). ( )
out in
in in
c n s n s n s n s n s n c n s n s n
s n c n s n c n (15)
where s0(n), s1(n) and s2(n) are the output of the LFSR 0 to 2. The LFSR’s used are
defined by polynomials as in Equation (3) to (5) in GF(2).
4.4 Multiplexer Register
This cipher uses a standard digital electronic component called multiplexer [9]. A
multiplexer has many inputs but only one output. The set of inputs (often termed
select lines) uses the state of LFSR 0, R0 to provide an address for the multiplexer. The
output of multiplexer is then merely the member of LFSR 1, R1 specified by the address.
Figure 4 shows the example of nonlinear combination for multiplexing generator.
Polynomial used to provide R0 and R1 respectively defined in Equation (12) and (13)
in GF(2).
Figure 4 A 4 to 1 multiplexing register
LFSR 0, R0
A0
Multiplexer
Output
LFSR 1, R1
A1 A2 B1 B3B2B0
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4.5 Shrinking Register
Shrinking register is a promising candidate for high speed encryption applications
[11]. This cipher uses 2 LFSR’s in non-linear combinations where LFSR R0 is used to
select a portion of the output sequence of a second LFSR R1. The keystream produced
from the output sequence of R1 is shown in Figure 5.
Instead of using LFSR R0 to select sequences of LFSR R1, modifying the condition
of selector is another method to implement this cipher. This modified cipher is called
XOR-shrinking register as shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6 The XOR-shrinking generator
LFSR 0, R0
Clock
LFSR 1, R1 Output bi
ai
bi
Discard bi
x = 1
x = 0
x = ai bi
Figure 5 The shrinking register
LFSR 0, R0
Clock
LFSR 1, R1 Output bi
ai
bi
Discard bi
ai = 1
ai = 0
Both shrinking and XOR-shrinking use polynomials as of Equation (12) and (13) in
GF(2) for LFSR R0 and R1.
Another type of shrinking cipher is called self-shrinking generator [7]. This cipher
uses single LFSR only. A pair of bits from LFSR is taken and if the first bit in the
pair is 1, the output of the generator is the second bit, or else, the pair will be
discarded and the same process repeats for the next clock. The polynomials used in
GF(2) is
= + + +2 3 64( ) 1f x x x x (16)
4.6 Variable-Memory Binary Generator (Memory Generator)
Variable-Memory Binary Generator which is also called memory generator needs
three LFSRs, R0, R1, R2 respectively and a memory to implement [12]. First, the output of
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R1 read out of the memory location addressed by the read address becomes a
keystream sequences. Second, the output bit of R0 is written into the memory location
addressed by the write address R2. Non-linear combination for this cipher is more
like substitution as shown in Figure 7.
For analysis purpose, two types of memory are used that are 16 and 64 addresses.
Polynomials involved for all LFSRs are defined in Equation (3) to (5) for GF(2).
5.0 TESTS FOR STREAM CIPHER
There are several tests that can be used to quantify the strength of stream ciphers.
Standard tests that are independent of the algorithm are statistical tests, correlation
attack and linear complexity profile. Nonstandard test specific to the algorithm based
on the guess-and-determine attack is also used.
5.1 Statistical Tests
A binary sequence is said to be random if there is no obvious relationship between
the individual bits of the sequence. Since the sequence generated by the LFSR is
periodic with a period p, then it is not considered a true random sequence but is
referred as a pseudorandom sequence or a pn (pseudonoise) sequence. For this class
of sequences, the randomness postulates by Golomb [13] is applicable. If the period p
is large, it is of interest to evaluate the randomness of the sequence within an observation
interval that is referred as the local randomness. The statistical tests are derived from
hypothesis testing and the standard statistical tables utilized are found in [14]. A set of
statistical tests applicable are frequency test, serial test, poker test, autocorrelation test
and runs test.
5.1.1 Frequency Test
This test calculates the number of ones and zeroes of the binary sequence and checks
if there is no large differences.
Figure 7 The variable-memory binary generator
LFSR 1, R1
2k - bit
memory
Read k bits
LFSR 0, R0
Write k bits
Input
LFSR 2, R2
Keystream
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5.1.2 Serial Test
The transition characteristics of a sequence such as the number 00, 01, 10 and 11 are
evaluated. Ideally, it should be uniformly distributed within the sequence.
5.1.3 Poker Test
A N length sequence is segmented into blocks of M bits and the total number of
segments is N/M. Within each segment, the integer value can vary from 0 to m = 2M-1.
The objective of this test is to count the frequency of occurrence of each M length
segment. Ideally, all the frequency of occurrences should be equal.
5.1.4 Autocorrelation Test
The test performs the autocorrelation of the sequence and compares the value of the
maximum peak with the value in the origin, the principal-secondary lobe. The worst
result of this test is when there is a large peak because many of bits shifted will reflect
the same behaviors as the originals. It is preferably having many reasonable middle
peaks than the few high peaks, also due to the correlation immune attack. The outcome
of the rest will reflect the relationship principal-secondary lobe in dB.
5.1.5 Runs Test
A sequence is divided into contiguous stream of 1’s that is referred as blocks and
contiguous stream of 0’s that is referred as gaps. If r0i is the number of gaps of length
i, then half of the gaps will have length 1 bit, a quarter with length 2 bits, and an eighth
with length 3 bits. If r1i is the number of blocks of length I, then the distribution of
blocks is similar to the number of gaps.
5.2 Correlation Attack
A pseudorandom sequence z(n) is generated by a combination of N LFSR where
s0(n), s1(n) ... sN(n) and p0, p1 ... pN are their input sequences and periods
respectively as shown in Figure 8. There is a possibility that any one of the input
sequences will leak into the output z(n). A sequence is said to be N-th order correlation
immuned if it is not possible to correlate any combination of n input sequence to the
output [15].
For a pseudorandom sequence that is proven statistically random, it is desired to
find a sequence from an external register that is correlated to this sequence. The
following block diagram of Figure 8 explains how this is done. The setting of the
attacking register to anyone of the input register will result in the resulting sequence
z0(n) to be nonrandom. The randomness of zA(n) is quantified by performing a statistical
test such as a frequency test on the sequence.
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5.3 Linear Complexity Profile
If N length sequence is
s(n) = [s(0) s(1) s(2) … s(N)] (17)
then the linear complexity of the sequence, denoted by L(N), is the length of the shortest
LFSR that will generate the first N terms of s(n). The properties of the linear complexity
for random sequence s(n) and r(n) are:
(i) For any N ≥ 1, the linear complexity of a sequence s(n) satisfies 0 ≤ L(N) ≤ N.
(ii) L(N) = 0 if and only if s(n) a zero sequence of length N.
(iii) L(N) = N if and only if s(n) = [0,0,0,0 ... 1].
(iv) If s(n) is periodic with period N, then L(N) ≤ N.
(v) If the linear complexity of s(n) and r(n) are L(N) and L(M) respectively, the linear
complexity of a sequence
z(n) =s(n) + r(n)
Its relation to L(N) and L(M) is
L(P) ≤ L(N) + L(M)
If s(n) sequence is defined as in sequence (17), then the linear complexity profile LN of
the sequence up to N is
L1, L2, … LN (18)
Ideally, the linear complexity profile of a random sequence will increase linearly
with the n. If the linear complexity approaches a constant value L, the resulting L-th
length LFSR can be used to regenerate the random sequence. For this analysis,
Figure 8 Methodology for performing correlation attack on a keystream generator
Combining
function
LFSR 0
s0(n)
Attacking
register
LFSR 1
LFSR N
s1(n)
sN–1(n)
z(n) zA(n)
JTjun46D[01].pmd 10/08/2007, 03:3110
COMPARISON ANALYSIS OF STREAM CIPHER ALGORITHMS 11
Berlekamp-Massey algorithms are used as Linear Complexity Profile Test and details
of the algorithm can be found in [16].
5.4 Guess and Determine (GD) Attacks
Guess and Determine (GD) is a non-standard and effective method in analyzing stream
ciphers. By considering the worst case condition, this attack will exploit the relationships
between internal values (such as the recurrence relationship in a shift register) and the
relationship used to construct the keystream values from the internal values [17]. A
GD attack guesses some internal values and then exploits the relationships to determine
other internal values. The cipher is broken when a complete internal state has been
determined from the guessed values. However, this attack limits on generators that use
more than one LFSR and their non-linear function is not complex where register value
and keystream that is produced correlates either forward or backward processes. Here
is the example of GD attacks on Multiplexing Generator. First, consider all of these
following assumptions:
(i) LFSR 1 becomes a selector and polynomial of LFSR 1 is GF(23):
f(x) = 1 + x2 + x3
(ii) LFSR 2 as input and polynomial of LFSR 2 is GF(24) :
f(x) = 1 + x3 + x4
(iii) Amount of keystream is known. For example: K(n) = 1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1
(iv) Complete knowledge of algorithm. In this case, the algorithm is using 4 to 1
multiplexer and X3 and X2 states as selectors.
Then, guess the initial condition of LFSR 1. In this case, total guessing equal to 23.
For each trial, the attackers will have the value of multiplexer selector and from this
value, the binary bit for each state of LFSR 2 will be determined. To make it easy, build
a truth table of LFSR 1 and LFSR 2 as shown in Figure 9. Then, put the keystream bit
by bit to each stage of LFSR 2 depending on the selector. Figure 9 shows that every
row of truth table filled with the keystream. Finally, fill the truth table for LFSR2. From
the truth table of LFSR 2, another secret or private key will appear and the algorithm is
not secure anymore. As a conclusion, the real strength of multiplexer algorithm depends
on LFSR 1 and in this case, instead of 27, the real strength of multiplexer algorithm is 23.
With reference to common key 64 bit, the strength of Multiplexing Generator is 229, not
264 as claimed.
JTjun46D[01].pmd 10/08/2007, 03:3111
ABD RAHIM MAT SIDEK & AHMAD ZURI SHA’AMERI12
6.0 RESULTS
Basically, the strength of stream cipher correlates with the size of key used. Although
the algorithms is not good but with the large key used and excellent key management
scheme, it could increase their performance. In practice, long messages are not
transmitted to avoid Possibility of Intercept (POI) and on average, data format for
military standard is around 4000 bits [18]. Therefore, with the constant key length which
is 64 bits, and 10 000 bits sequence, the strength comparison of stream cipher was
made. For statistical test, 1000 different initial conditions were chosen randomly and
all the results are shown in Table 1.
Table 1 presents the number of keys that passed for each statistical test. Based on
95% significant level, a good generator should passes at least 950 over 1000 initial
conditions or keys. This is true only for self-shrinking generator. Thus, the probability
of choosing a set of keys that generate a statistically random sequence is higher for this
generator as compared to the linear, gaffe, multiplexing, both summation registers
(Z0 and cout output), XOR-shrinking, and both memory (16 and 64 addresses) generator.
Even though self-shrinking has good statistical properties but on the average, the
sequence length of LFSR to produce the same amount of keystream with other generators
is double. This is because the characteristic of self-shrinking itself that needs 2 bits or
more to produce 1 bit of keystream. Therefore, the processing time to produce keystream
also increases.
For memory generators, the size of memory obviously influences their randomness.
A large memory size will present a better keystream compared with smaller memory
due to statistical characteristics. From the table, both summation 2 and 3 registers
(Z0 output) give a good statistical result as compared to both summation 2 and 3
registers (Cout output). Summation 3 register (Z0 output) presents a better statistical
characteristic as compared to summation 2 registers (Z0 output). From this observation,
the number of register used in this generator influences their randomness.
(a) LFSR 1
Figure 9 Truth table for both LFSRs
(b) LFSR 2
X2 X1X3X2 X1X3
1 11
1 01
0 01
0 10
1 00
0 11
1 10
1 11
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
X4
JTjun46D[01].pmd 10/08/2007, 03:3112
COMPARISON ANALYSIS OF STREAM CIPHER ALGORITHMS 13
T
ab
le
 1
R
es
ul
ts
 fo
r e
ac
h 
te
st
 o
f k
ey
st
re
am
 g
en
er
at
or
s
N
o.
G
en
er
at
or
F
re
q
.
Se
ri
al
P
ok
er
A
u
to
.
R
u
n
s
C
or
r.
L
C
P
G
D
.
te
st
te
st
te
st
te
st
te
st
at
ta
ck
s
(M
ax
)
at
ta
ck
1
Li
ne
ar
83
0/
10
00
94
1/
10
00
10
00
/1
00
0
18
52
2/
19
00
0
92
0/
10
00
56
/6
0 
im
m
un
e
71
24
2
2
G
ef
fe
95
6/
10
00
81
8/
10
00
73
2/
10
00
17
96
2/
19
00
0
80
0/
10
00
0/
60
 im
m
un
e
16
65
24
8
3
Su
m
 2
 r
eg
.(z
0 
ou
tp
ut
)
98
6/
10
00
97
5/
10
00
97
9/
10
00
18
00
2/
19
00
0
86
3/
10
00
25
/4
0 
im
m
un
e
50
00
22
9
4
Su
m
 2
 r
eg
. (
C
ou
t o
ut
pu
t)
68
9/
10
00
76
0/
10
00
72
8/
10
00
18
23
1/
19
00
0
98
1/
10
00
3/
40
 im
m
un
e
23
78
22
9
5
Su
m
 3
 r
eg
.(z
0 
ou
tp
ut
)
10
00
/1
00
0
98
4/
10
00
10
00
/1
00
0
16
74
8/
19
00
0
91
5/
10
00
54
/6
0 
im
m
un
e
50
00
24
2
6
Su
m
 3
 r
eg
 (C
ou
t o
ut
pu
t)
0/
10
00
0/
10
00
0/
10
00
10
00
/1
90
00
69
1/
10
00
5/
60
 im
m
un
e
25
56
24
2
7
M
ul
tip
le
xi
ng
96
3/
10
00
0/
10
00
0/
10
00
15
56
2/
19
00
0
86
5/
10
00
19
/4
0 
im
m
un
e
50
00
22
9
8
Sh
rin
ki
ng
99
2/
10
00
73
9/
10
00
98
1/
10
00
17
31
6/
19
00
0
93
3/
10
00
38
/4
0 
im
m
un
e
50
00
22
9
9
X
O
R
-S
hr
in
ki
ng
98
7/
10
00
99
2/
10
00
66
3/
10
00
17
72
6/
19
00
0
96
1/
10
00
38
/4
0 
im
m
un
e
50
00
26
4
10
Se
lf
-S
h
ri
n
k
in
g
99
8/
10
00
98
9/
10
00
99
3/
10
00
18
57
8/
19
00
0
97
4/
10
00
19
/
20
 i
m
m
u
n
e
50
00
2
6
4
11
M
em
or
y 
ge
n.
 (1
6 
ad
d)
84
2/
10
00
0/
10
00
0/
10
00
20
82
/1
90
00
57
9/
10
00
33
/6
0 
im
m
un
e
50
00
26
4
12
M
em
or
y 
ge
n.
 (6
4 
ad
d)
88
2/
10
00
63
6/
10
00
99
4/
10
00
12
36
0/
19
00
0
93
7/
10
00
50
/6
0 
im
m
un
e
50
00
26
4
JTjun46D[01].pmd 10/08/2007, 03:3113
ABD RAHIM MAT SIDEK & AHMAD ZURI SHA’AMERI14
The XOR-Shrinking generator, which was modified by the researcher also presented
a better statistical results compared with the original Shrinking generator. However, it
still did not passed 95% significant level.
For correlation attacks, linear generator, summations 3 registers (Z0 output), shrinking,
XOR-shrinking, self-shrinking and memory generators (64 addresses) present good
performance where 80% of attacks are immune. For multiplexing, memory registers
(16 addresses) and summation 2 registers (Z0 output), half of the possible attacks were
successful. Others generators were absolutely not immune and can be easily broken
by this attack. Notice that the strength of generator will reduce to 2N trials with N as
the length of LFSR that leaks into keystream.
Linear Complexity Profile (LCP) is another standard test for measurement of
strength and for this analysis, 10 000 bits keystream for each generator are used. Ideally,
the LCP for each generator should be half of sequence length, which is 5000. From
Table 2, linear generator, improved Geffe and summations register (cout output) are not
secure against LCP attack. Others are immune that have large LCP, which increase
linearly with sequence length until 5000. Which means that, 10 000 bit keystream is not
enough to find their equivalent LFSR. From the LCP test, a relation between LCP and
key length can be derived but limited for certain generators such as linear generator
and summation 2 registers (cout output). Their relations are as follows:
(i) Linear generator: Lmax = N0+N1+N2 = 19+23+29 = 71
(ii) Summation 2 registers (cout output): Lmax = 2N0N1 = 2(29)(41) = 2378
A Guess-and-Determine attack is called nonstandard test because this performed
attack depends on generator. Different generators will produce different GD attacks.
As the key length is fixed to 64 bits, the best result for this attack is 264. There are 4
generators that are immune on this attack where their strength after the attack are 264,
same as they claimed. They are XOR-shrinking, self-shrinking and both of memory
generators. While for others, the strength of generators were reduced to 229, 242 and 248
respectively.
Self-shrinking generator that succeeded standard tests is immune of GD attacks. It
is really robust and satisfies the properties of good stream cipher. However, it does not
mean that it will be unbreakable. It could be broken with another nonstandard or
mathematical attack, which is not included in this study.
7.0 CONCLUSIONS
The stream cipher is a type of cipher system where the process of enciphering and
deciphering is performed one bit at a time. This type of cipher is useful in noisy
channel conditions such as in radio communication environment for bulk data
transmission. The basic theory for LFSR and the criteria for randomness are explained.
The comparison of generator is performed on seven types of generator which are
JTjun46D[01].pmd 10/08/2007, 03:3114
COMPARISON ANALYSIS OF STREAM CIPHER ALGORITHMS 15
linear, improved Geffe, summation register, multiplexing, shrinking and memory
generator. The analyses of their performance are made based on the statistical test,
correlation attack, linear complexity profile and guess and determine attacks.
After the analyses, it is found that the only generator that succeeded all tests is self-
shrinking. With the present performance of computer technology in terms of speed
and memory space, this generator can be implemented easily on application such as
messaging system, e-mail or any radio communication system. Due to its characteristic,
this generator will guarantee the digital information exchange through radio
communication is confidential. Other generators were shown to have their strength
and weaknesses. However, it does not mean that they could not be used because the
implementation choice depends on application and the information to protect.
REFERENCES
[1] Sailmail: Email Services for Yachts via Marine HF SSB Radio. 2004. http://www.sailmail.com/ (Accessed on
14/05/2005)
[2] CruiseEmail.com. 2004. http://www.cruiseemail.com/ (Accessed on 29/07/2005)
[3] Mils: The Secret of Unconditional Security. 2004. http://www.mils.com/ (Accessed on 06/06/2006)
[4] Crypto AG: For Communication & Information Security. 2004. http://www.crypto.ch/(Accessed on 14/09/
2006)
[5] Nichols, K. and C. Lekkas. 2002. Wireless Security: Models, Threats and Solution. Canada:The McGraw-Hill
Companies.
[6] Lail, M. 2002. Broadband Network & Device Security. Canada: The McGraw-Hill Companies.
[7] Schneier, B. 1996. Applied Cryptography. Minneapolis: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
[8] Stallings, W. 2003. Cryptography and Network Security. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
[9] Beker, H. and F. Piper. 1982. Cipher Systems: Protection of Communication. London: Northwood Publication.
[10] Press, W. and S. Teukolsky. 1992. Numerical Recipes in C. London: Cambridge University Press.
[11] Menezes, A. and P. Van oorshot. 1996. Handbook of Applied Cryptography. California: CRC Press.
[12] Golic, J. and M. Mihaljevic. 1990. Minimal Linear Equivalent Analysis of a Variable-Memory Binary
Sequence Generator. IEEE Transaction on Information Theory. 36(1): 190-192.
[13] Golomb, S. 1967. Shift Register Sequences. UK: Holden Day.
[14] Johnson, R. 1992. Elementary Statistics. Boston: PWS-Kent.
[15] Siegenthaler, T. 1984. Correlation-immunity of Nonlinear Combining Functions for Cryptographic
Applications. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory. 30: 776-780.
[16] Massey, J. L. 1969. Shift Register Synthesis and BCH Coding Decoding. IEEE Transaction Information
Theory. 15: 122-127.
[17] Hawkes, P. and G. G. Rose. 2002. Guess and Determine Attacks on SNOW. Sydney: Qualcomm Australia.
[18] ACP 127(G). 1988. Communication Instructions Tape Relay Procedures. Allied Communication Publication.
JTjun46D[01].pmd 10/08/2007, 03:3115
